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STATE-FUNDED DISCRIMINATION: SECTION 504
OF THE REHABILITATION ACT AND ITS UNEVEN
APPLICATION TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
AND OTHER WORKERS
Thomas B. Heywooc
Kim was a medical records clerk and receptionist for a small doctor's office
in Oklahoma.' Fred was a doctor, small business owner, and Kim's employer.2
In 1984, Kim was diagnosed with cancer and over the following years she
sought treatment for her disease, which included undergoing a number of
surgeries. After a surgery in 1998, Kim was unable to resume her
employment at Fred's practice for several months.4 Despite this lapse in time,
Fred often assured her that her job was safe.5 Yet, when Kim felt healthy
enough to return to work, Fred refused to let her do so because of her
condition. 6
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Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 7 explicitly
prohibits an employer from discharging an employee on the basis of a medical
condition, such as cancer.8  Nevertheless, Fred's brash refusal to rehire Kim
did not violate Title I's prohibition because, under the statute, an "employer" is
an individual who employs fifteen or more people-a threshold that Fred's
business did not meet. Thus, Fred's business did not qualify as a covered
entity under the statute and fell outside the scope of Title 1.
Undeterred, Kim hired an attorney to represent her in an
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2006). The stated purpose of the ADA of 1990 is "to provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." Id § 12101(b)(1). Title I prohibits disability-based discrimination
by employers. Id § 12112(a). Title 11 prohibits such discrimination by public entities and public
transportation. Id. § 12132. However, some courts have held that Title II does not cover
employment. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Or. Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999)
("[T]he ADA's linkage of Title I and the Rehabilitation Act establishes that Congress thought that
the ADA's employment-related provisions were embodied in Title I, not Title II. Congress made
this linkage even stronger in 1992 when it amended the Rehabilitation Act to incorporate
employment-related standards from Title I, not Title II .... ). Title III prohibits
disability-related discrimination by places of public accommodation and commercial facilities.
Id § 12182(a). Title IV requires telecommunications companies to provide functionally
equivalent telephone services to those suffering from hearing or speech impairments. 47 U.S.C.
§ 225(b)(1) (2006). Despite the statutory protection afforded those with disabilities as well as
prohibitions against discriminating based on other protected attributes, namely race and gender,
the general rule is still that an employee works at the will of his employer. See, e.g., Criscione v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 384 N.E.2d 91, 95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) ("[A]n employment at will
relationship can be terminated for 'a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all."' (quoting
Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1977))). The United States is the only
industrialized nation that uses the employment-at-will doctrine. RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED
JUSTICE 3-4 (2001) (discussing the problems of workplace hierarchies and their impact on the
disabled).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. Itt 2009) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees . . . ."); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (Supp. Ill 2009)
(defining disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities"); Id § 12102(2)(B) (including "normal cell growth" as a "major life
activity"). Because cancer affects normal cell growth, it falls within the scope of disabilities
covered by the ADA. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 323 (Donald Venes et al.
eds., 20th ed. 2005) (defining cancer as "[m]alignant neoplasia marked by the uncontrolled
growth of cells").
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006) ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person . .
. ."); see also Schrader, 296 F.3d at 974 (indicating that the fifteen or more employees threshold
balances the conflicting goals of eliminating discrimination, while not burdening small businesses
with the costs of litigating potential claims).
10. See Schrader, 296 F.3d at 969 (accepting the district court's finding that Fred's business
had fewer than fifteen employees).
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employment-discrimination suit." Although Kim's claim fell outside the
ADA's scope, thus foreclosing any relief under that statute, Kim's attorney
discovered an alternate claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 12
This provision of law prohibits discrimination based on disability by entities
receiving federal funding.13  Because Fred accepted federal funds through
Medicare and Medicaid, Kim was able to file her claim under section 504.14
Ultimately, Kim received a favorable decision from the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.' 5 The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, but the
parties settled before the case could be tried on the merits.16
Other courts, however, have required that in addition to the fifteen-employee
threshold, an employer-employee relationship must exist for the
antidiscrimination protections of the Rehabilitation Act to apply, thus leaving
independent contractors' outside the scope of section 504. 8 These courts
11. See Oklahoma Bar Journal, Attorney Feels the Rewards ofPro Bono Work, OKLA. BAR
ASS'N, http://www.okbar.org/obj/accesstojustice/021205.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter OKLA. BAR Ass'N].
12. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)); OKLA. BAR ASS'N, supra note 11. Although the
Rehabilitation Act incorporates ADA standards, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Act does not
retain the same definition of "employer" and remanded the case to the trial court to further
determine whether there was discrimination by a federally-funded entity under these facts.
Schrader, 296 F.3d at 969-70.
13. Rehabilitation Act § 504. Although brief in its public law form, section 504 explicitly
prohibited disability-based discrimination by any program or activity receiving federal funding.
Id
14. OKLA. BAR Ass'N, supra note 11. In the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Congress provided an expansive definition of what "program or activity" qualifies as an entity
receiving federal funding. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, sec. 4,
§ 504, 102 Stat. 28, 29 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)); S. REP. No. 100-64, at 4
(1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6 ("The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 amends
[section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973] by adding a section defining the phrase 'program
or activity' and 'program' to make clear that discrimination is prohibited throughout entire
agencies or institutions if any part receives Federal financial assistance."). Congress intended for
the Civil Rights Restoration Act to rectify the misinterpretation of section 504 and similar statutes
by the Supreme Court in several decisions that "unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon [section
504's] broad application." Civil Rights Restoration Act §2 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1687 (2006)). For example, the Civil Rights Restoration Act superseded the Supreme Court's
decision in Grove City College v. Bell, which had limited Title IX protection against gender
discrimination under the Education Amendments of 1972 to the specific programs or recipients of
federal funding, rather than to the institution as a whole. Civil Rights Restoration Act, sec. 3,
§ 908; Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984) (holding that the grant of federal
aid to some students does not subject the entire university to Title IX), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, sec. 3, § 908; see also S. REP. NO. 100-64, at 4.
15. OKLA. BAR ASS'N, supra note I1.
16. Id
17. An independent contractor is "[o]ne who is entrusted to undertake a specific project but
who is left free to do the assigned work and to choose the method for accomplishing it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 785 (8th ed. 2004).
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supported their decisions by relying on subsection (d) of section 504, which
incorporates the standards applied under Title I of the ADA. 19 This Comment
addresses the scope of section 504, particularly analyzing the language of
subsection (d), in two distinct but doctrinally related types of cases: (1) those
in which the court is asked whether the number of employees is material to a
section 504 claim; and (2) those in which the court is asked whether an
independent contractor may bring a claim under section 504.20
On the eve of the ADA's twentieth anniversary in 20 10,21 the United States
Supreme Court declined to review a case from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals that had extended section 504 protection to independent contractors. 22
Since that time, the incorporation provision in section 504(d) has continued to
engender confusion, causing a current split among the circuit courts.23
The Rehabilitation Act, signed into law in 1973, became the first major
federal statute to protect the rights of persons with disabilities.24 Congress
intended for the Act to provide a private right of action to disabled
25 26individuals experiencing discrimination in federally-funded programs.
18. See, e.g., Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'I Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the plaintiff had no cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act due to his status as
an independent contractor, which does not equate to an "employee"); Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d
542, 547 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiffs action could not be brought under the
Rehabilitation Act because the plaintiffs supervisors did not meet the statutory definition of an
"employer").
19. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, sec. 506, § 504(d), 106
Stat. 4344, 4428 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2006)) ("The standards used to
determine whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging employment
discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. . . .").
20. Subsection (d) resolves the broad issue of whether to wholly or selectively incorporate
Title I into section 504. See Fleming v. Yuma Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir.
2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 3468 (2010). This Comment, however, focuses on a narrower issue
in order to gain greater insight into the intended coverage of these two discrete situations.
21. President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into law in July 1990. Statement on
Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1070 (July 26, 1990).
22. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 938.
23. See Current Circuit Splits: Civil Matters: Employment Law, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT
REv. 335, 345-46 (2010) (describing how the Ninth Circuit in Fleming acknowledged the
existing circuit split regarding interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act, and ultimately issued a
holding that added to the confusion).
24. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 940 (quoting Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir.
1990)); see also Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 626 (1984) ("The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 establishes a comprehensive federal program aimed at improving the lot of the
handicapped."), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 § 504.
25. A disabled person is defined generally as an individual "incapacitated by illness or
injury," or "physically or mentally impaired in a way that substantially limits activity."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 355 (11th ed. 2003). Title I of the ADA
utilizes a similar definition of disability, which includes "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. §
12102(1)(A) (Supp. Ill 2009). Expanding on the dictionary definition, the ADA delineates
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Although section 504 expressly covers "any program or activity," no language
in the Rehabilitation Act mentions or limits its application to a specific
employment relationship.27
The ADA extended these proscriptions beyond entities receiving federal
funds.28 In this regard, Title I seemingly enlarges the scope of discrimination
"major life activities" as including, but not limited to, "caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." Id. § 12102(2)(A). The
ADA also considers major life activities to include "major bodily functions," which encompass
"functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological,
brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions." Id. § 12102(2)(B). The
Rehabilitation Act provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), the term
'individual with a disability' means any individual who-(i) has a physical or mental impairment
which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to employment; and
(ii) can benefit in terms of an employment outcome from vocational rehabilitation services." 29
U.S.C. § 705(20)(A) (2006). Subsection (B) further states that the definition of disability also
includes any person considered disabled under the ADA's statutory definition. Id. § 705(20)(B)
(Supp. III 2009); Michael Borella, Food Allergies in Public Schools: Toward a Model Code, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 761, 767 (2010) (indicating that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act use
substantially similar language in defining who constitutes a disabled person under each statute).
Although the discussion today is about the disabled, the original language of the Rehabilitation
Act used the word "handicapped." See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87
Stat. 355, 361. The statutory language was changed to "disability" in 1990, with the enactment of
the ADA. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3, 104 Stat. 327,
329 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006)). This signaled a step forward in society's
perception of the disabled because, while perhaps unknown to most, some say that the word
"handicap" derives from the saying "cap in hand"-a reference to panhandling. A Brief History of
the Disability Rights Movement, DISABILITY LAW CENTER, http://www.disabilitylawcenter.org
/about/a brief historyof dr movement.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2011).
26. Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Niehaus
v. Kan. Bar Ass'n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 1986)). An express purpose of the
Rehabilitation Act was to "promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and
private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in employment."
Darrone, 465 U.S. at 626 (quoting Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 2(8)).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2006). This section explicitly references the following entities as
qualifying as a "program or activity": departments, agencies and other instrumentalities of a state;
colleges and universities; corporations, partnerships and sole proprietorships; and any
organization created through combination of the above entities. Id. The brief, original language
of the public law establishing section 504 fails to mention specific entities, but, nevertheless, still
clearly applies section 504 to "any program or activity." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 ("No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.").
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006) (stating that the ADA intended to "provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities" and not including any limitation to federally-funded programs); Id. § 12111(2)
(providing that the entities covered under Title I of the ADA are "employer[s], employment
agenc[ies], labor organization[s], [and] joint labor-management committee[s]," without any
reference to a federal-funding requirement); see also Schrader, 296 F.3d at 974 ("Unlike the
blanket involuntary coverage of the ADA, however, the Rehabilitation Act's coverage extends
only to entities that choose to receive federal assistance.").
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protection. However, Title I specifically contemplates application to only the
employment relationship. 29 Subsequent to the passage of the ADA, Congress
amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1992, adding section 504(d).3 0 This section
incorporates standards from Title I of the ADA to aid in determining when a
violation of section 504 has occurred.31
Recent case law illustrates how the courts have struggled in interpreting the
32incorporation provision of section 504(d). In 1999, the Sixth Circuit
indicated in Hiler v. Brown that suits brought under the Rehabilitation Act
incorporated the ADA's statutory definition of "employer."33  In 2002, the
Tenth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, MD.,
P.C. holding, instead, that section 504(d) did not incorporate Title I's
requirement of "15 or more employees"34 into the Rehabilitation Act.35 This
split deepened in 2006 when the Eighth Circuit, in Wojewski v. Rapid City
Regional Hospital, Inc., found the similarities between the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act to preclude the extension of coverage of section 504 to a
group not covered by Title I.36 In 2009, the Ninth Circuit evened the split in
Fleming v. Yuma Regional Medical Center, analyzing the language in the two
statutes and concluding that Congress intended that they serve two separate
functions.37
The ADA specifically contemplates the employer-employee relationship,
while the Rehabilitation Act paints with a much broader brush, focusing on
"otherwise qualified" individuals in "any program or activity."38 Some courts
have concluded that Congress intended this distinction because, while the
Rehabilitation Act covers a more expansive group of workers, their right of
action is limited to discriminatory behavior by programs receiving federal
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. III 2009) (prohibiting discrimination under Title I
within the confines of the "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment"); Fleming, 587 F.3d
at 942 (noting that Title I's scope is limited to cover only employment relationships).
30. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, sec. 506, § 504(d), 106
Stat. 4344, 4428 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); Schrader, 296 F.3d at 971 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)).
32. See infra, notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing how various circuit courts
have issued contradictory holdings on the issue).
33. Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[T]his Court finds that Hiler cannot
sue his supervisors under . . . the Rehabilitation Act since his supervisors do not meet the
statutory definition of an 'employer."' (citations omitted)). Under the ADA, an employer is one
who employs at least fifteen employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
35. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 975.
36. Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
that an independent contractor cannot invoke the protections of the Rehabilitation Act).
37. Fleming v. Yuma Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2009) (asserting that the
broad language of the Rehabilitation Act applies to all types of workers, including independent
contractors), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3468 (2010).
38. Id at 941-42.
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funds. 39 Although this issue has resulted in opposing holdings by the federal
circuits, the Supreme Court continues to avoid resolving the conflict.40
Part I of this Comment discusses the history behind Congress's enactment of
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Part I also provides insight into the
pertinent statutory provisions of these Acts and related regulations, particularly
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title I of the ADA. Part II explores
the basis for the current circuit split, with a focus on the varying rationales
used by the courts. Part III addresses the shortfalls in the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits' interpretation of the scope of the Rehabilitation Act. Part III then
analyzes these shortfalls with regard to (1) the plain language of the statute, (2)
the interior coherence of the statutory scheme, (3) the legislative history, and
(4) supportive case law, ultimately finding that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
were thorough in supporting their conclusions. Part III then presents the
compelling political and social need for protection of the disabled as well as
increased protection of nonemployees affected by disability, particularly
independent contractors. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Supreme
Court should adopt the approaches advocated by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,
providing a bright-line rule that unequivocally protects all workers under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
I. THE ENACTMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF DISABILITY LAWS
A. The Rehabilitation Act
1. Background and Adoption of the Act in 1973
The history of the Rehabilitation Act can be traced back to the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act,41 a post-World War I statute "mandat[ing] vocational
rehabilitation programs for disabled veterans."42 In 1920, the Smith-Fess Act43
extended these protections to civilians, 44 and sought to "offer[] limited services
39. See, e.g., Schrader, 296 F.3d at 974 (noting that "the balance between prohibiting
discrimination and protecting small entities" is nevertheless struck in the Rehabilitation Act
despite its broad scope).
40. See, e.g., Yuma Anesthesia Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Fleming, 130 S. Ct. 3468 (2010)
(denying petition for writ of certiorari from the Ninth Circuit).
41. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 107, 40 Stat. 617, 617 (1918) ("[This]
Act . . . provide[s] for vocational rehabilitation and return to civil employment of disabled
persons discharged from the military or naval forces.").
42. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:
What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About it? 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91,
95-96 (2000).
43. Act of June 20, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 41 Stat. 735, repealed and reenacted by
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 731-741 (2006)).
44. See id; H.R. REP. No. 93-244, at 3 (1973). Joseph Shapiro explains that the disabled
began organizing advocacy groups toward the end of the nineteenth century, culminating in the
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for the physically handicapped."4 5  These services and programs strove to
rehabilitate, train, and ultimately find work placement for disabled people who,
in the general consciousness, would be a burden on many employers.46
Congress implemented the first amendments to the Smith-Fess Act after World
War 1I, 47 increasing the scope of vocational rehabilitation programs to include
mentally handicapped individuals.48  The Amendments expanded coverage
beyond the limited services of training, counseling, and placement through the
addition of statutory language to include "any services necessa 7 to render a
disabled individual fit to engage in a remunerative occupation." This early
history illustrates how these initial programs fixated on rehabilitating disabled
persons, without focusing on their right to be free from discrimination.o
Society's perspective regarding the relationship between the disabled and the
workplace began to change during the 1970s.51 The Civil Rights Act of 1964
seemingly provided a perfect model for a new rights-based approach to
employment discrimination against the disabled; however, as enacted, the Act
applied only to "race, color, religion, sex, [and] national origin." 52 Opposition
to an extension of civil rights protection to cover the disabled was so strong
that proposals made in the earlz 1970s to amend the Civil Rights Act to
include disabled persons failed. In fact, even when section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was introduced, Congress did not intend for the
provision to institute rights for disabled people. 54 In a 1972 House report, the
Committee on Education and Labor defined the Rehabilitation Act without any
enactment of several state statutes in the 1920s and 1930s. JOSEPH SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 63 (1993).
45. H.R. REP. NO. 93-244, at 3.
46. See O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 4-5 (indicating that disabled people were seen as a threat
to workplace hierarchy and they needed to overcome their disabilities in order to enter the
workforce).
47. H.R. REP. NO. 93-244, at 3.
48. Id
49. Id (quoting the Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-
113, 69 Stat. 652 (1943) (internal quotation marks omitted) (repealed 1973)).
50. O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 6-7 (describing how the rehabilitation centers had the
ultimate goal of achieving normalcy, seeking to "make . .. people fit in with society"). Professor
Chai R. Feldblum characterized this phenomenon as the "'medical model' of disability," as
opposed to the prior prevailing "exclusionary model" of earlier years. Feldblum, supra note 42,
at 95-96.. The medical model was predicated on integration requiring a change in the disabled
person rather than changing the societal aspects that further impeded the disabled person's ability
to function in that society. Id. at 96.
51. O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 107.
52. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)); O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 132
(observing that those individuals unhappy with the employment protection provided by the
Rehabilitation Act favored legislation amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by inserting
"handicapped condition" wherever the other classes, such as race and gender, were mentioned).
53. O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 114.
54. Id. at 112.
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emphasis on rights.55 Some scholars have even commented that from the early
days of vocational rehabilitation, the Rehabilitation Act developed an
"antirights emphasis" that persisted into the 1970s.56 Nevertheless, after its
passage in 1973, the Rehabilitation Act ultimately became a civil rights statute
protecting and promoting persons with disabilities, and preventing
discrimination in programs receiving federal funding.57 Although the Act's
broad language and limited legislative history create interpretation problems
regarding Congress's intent, determining the scope of section 504 has proven
to be particularly troublesome in the courts.
2. Amending the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Inclusion of the Incorporation
Provision in Section 504(d)
Several circuit courts have recently decided a number of cases that required
interpreting the following language from section 504(d) of the Rehabilitation
Act: "The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated
in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be
the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 . . . ."59 Congress added subsection (d) through section 506 of the
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, which was enacted "to revise and
extend the program of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."60 Nearly twenty years
of "judicial experimentation" with the unfamiliar Act and its limited legislative
55. See H.R. REP. No. 93-244, at 1-2 (1973) (characterizing the Rehabilitation Act as
implementing "a combination of services provided as needed to physically or mentally
handicapped persons to prepare them for employment and productive, useful living").
56. O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 108.
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2006) (providing affirmative action and nondiscrimination
protection for disabled persons in federal government positions); 29 U.S.C. § 793 (mandating
affirmative action in regards to federal contracts in excess of $10,000); id § 794 (precluding
discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal funds); id § 794a (providing remedies
for violations of § 791 and § 794 of this Act comparable to those available under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); see also Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The
Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1424 (1991) (illustrating the protections provided by the
Rehabilitation Act). This change from an antirights focus to a civil rights focus was
groundbreaking because Congress finally acknowledged that societal prejudices were the cause
of the lesser status given to disabled Americans. W.S. Miller, Ganden v. NCAA: How the
NCAA's Efforts to Clean Up Its Image Have Created an Ethical and Legal Dilemma, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 465, 467 (1997).
58. See, e.g., Fleming v. Yuma Reg'l Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 940-42 (9th Cir. 2009)
(discussing section 504 and finding that the Rehabilitation Act has a broader scope than the
ADA), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 3468 (2010); Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'] Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d
338, 345 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting the similarities between the two statutes and finding it was
Congress's intent that they have a similar scope); see also Cooper, supra note 57, at 1424
(explaining that although most provisions of the Rehabilitation Act are somewhat vague, section
504's open-ended nature has created significant interpretational issues).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).
60. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344, 4344.
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history necessitated the amendment.61 Although the incorporation of Title I
kept the body of disability law consistent for the immediate future,62 the circuit
courts have struggled with the breadth of this incorporation.63
B. Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Congress passed the ADA in 1990 to rovide comprehensive civil rights
coverage to the disabled community. The Act was considered a
"humanitarian law" that "transcended partisan lines." 65  Title I prohibits
discrimination against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in any
61. See Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Trials of
Textualism and the Practical Limits of Practical Reason, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1231 (2000).
The regulatory environment surrounding the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act in 1973 was
particularly unclear because the Act did not explicitly charge any regulatory agency with the
responsibility of enforcing its provisions, and, as a result, regulations implementing the Act were
not codified in the Code of Federal Regulations until 1985, well after the President ordered
executive agencies to promulgate them in 1980. Renee L. Cyr, Note, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible
Employees, 57 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1237, 1239-40 (1992) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3
C.F.R. 298 (1980-1981)).
62. See S. REP. No. 102-357, at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712, 3713
(indicating a desire to conform to the "precepts and values" of the Americans with Disabilities
Act in adopting the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992).
63. Compare Fleming, 587 F.3d at 939 (holding that the incorporation of Title I into the
Rehabilitation Act is selective), and Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968, 975
(10th Cir. 2002) (supporting selective incorporation), with Wojewski, 450 F.3d at 345 (holding
that the similarities indicated that Section 504(d) was intended to broadly incorporate Title 1), and
Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title 's definition of employer
was incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act).
64. 135 CONG. REC. 19,812 (1989) (statement of Sen. Cranston) (indicating that the ADA's
enactment "would build on 16 years of successful experience with section 504 to eliminate
disability discrimination in the private sector and all levels of units of Government"); see also
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Comm. on Labor &
Human Res., and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 195 (1989) (statement of
Richard L. Thornburgh, Att'y Gen. of the United States) ("It is exciting for me to be a part of the
process which, this year, will pass legislation that will extend the Nation's civil rights guarantees
to the disabled community."). A look at international disability law uncovers two basic
approaches to disability rights. Katharina Heyer, From Special Needs to Equal Rights: Japanese
Disability Law, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 7:1, 7:2 (2000). The ADA, as well as disability
rights laws in Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, follow the first approach,
which bans discrimination in order to provide equal opportunities for disabled citizens. Id at
7:2-7:3. The second approach "aims for equality of results by emphasizing special needs over
equal rights[,] and mandating quotas." Id at 7:3. This approach, adopted by Japan and many
countries in Europe, aims to provide the disabled with greater employment opportunities. Id
While the ADA approach mandates "blind justice," the European and Japanese approach
cherishes differences. Id For an interesting discussion of disability law among the former
Soviet-bloc nations, see Oliver Lewis, Mental Disability Law in Central and Eastern Europe:
Paper, Practice, Promise, 8 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 293 (2002).
65. O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 162.
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stage of the employment process.66 To further illuminate this protection, Title
I expounds the employment relationsh . An employee is defined as "an
individual employed by an employer." This nondefinition lacks sufficient
clarity to guide any sort of legal analysis. 69  Fortunately, Title I more
specifically defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees." 70
C. An Examination of the Federal Regulations Implementing the
Rehabilitation Act
The regulations enacted by major administrative agencies provide essential
insight into the implementation of the Rehabilitation Act's statutory scheme,
particularly section 504.71 Exemplifying the general trend, Department of
Justice (DOJ) regulations mirror the broad scope of the Rehabilitation Act by
utilizing the same language-"any program or activity"-regarding
coverage.72 However, limitations on coverage can be found in DOJ
regulations, such as the stipulation that "[a] recipient [of federal funding] that
employs fifteen or more persons shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids to
qualified handicapped persons." 73 This section suggests that recipients with
less than fifteen employees are not required to provide auxiliary aids; thus,
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination with regard to "job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment").
67. Id. § 12111(4)-{5).
68. Id. § 12111(4).
69. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One
and How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298-99 (2001)
(discussing the confusion with regard to definitions of working relationships).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). Congress chose to exempt entities with fewer than fifteen
employees in order to insulate small businesses from some of the potentially expensive mandates
of Title I. See 135 CONG. REC. 19,835 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The purpose ... is to
help small small [sic] businesses, because this bill is going to be very expensive."). Senator
Hatch noted further, "there is absolutely no consideration given to small small [sic] businesses
similarly situated with regard to the public accommodations aspect." Id. at 19836. Consequently,
a small store would be free to discriminate when it hires a clerk, but it would be forced to abide
by the ADA in service to its customers. Id. As a solution, Senator Hatch recommended tax
credits for small businesses that abide by these public accommodations mandates. Id
71. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 8.1-.2 (2010) (implementing Rehabilitation Act provisions to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development); 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.501-.502 (2010) (applying the
Rehabilitation Act to organizations within the Department of Justice); 34 C.F.R. § 104.1-.2
(2010) (implementing the Rehabilitation Act to the Department of Education); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.1-.2 (2010) (providing Rehabilitation Act regulations to the Department of Health and
Human Services). These regulations are an essential component of the Rehabilitation Act's
history because section 504 in its initial form was quite brief and did not provide any guidance as
to the implementation of its mandates. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87.
Stat. 355; see also supra note 61.
72. 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(a).
73. Id. § 42.503(f).
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certain persons with disabilities will be unable to participate in these programs
or activities. 74 The rationale behind such tolerance for discrimination in this
limited context is explained by the final sentence of the section, which states
"[d]epartment officials may require recipients employing fewer than fifteen
persons to provide auxiliary aids when this would not significantly impair the
ability of the recipient to provide its benefits or services."" The DOJ
attempted to avoid burdening smaller providers with onerous requirements that
potentially could prevent those providers from offering their benefits or
services to anyone. 6 The DOJ regulations do not utilize the terms "employer"
or "employee"; rather, the DOJ frames the regulations in terms of "recipients"
of federal financial assistance and "qualified handica ped persons," with no
personnel threshold for qualification as a recipient. Thus, such explicit
exceptions for small providers in certain instances indicate that general
enforcement is not limited to employers with fewer than fifteen employees.
This leaves the expansive definition of "program or activity"n as the only
factor limiting application of the regulation to employment discrimination
against qualified handicapped persons.
74. See id
75. Id
76. See id. (limiting the requirement of providing auxiliary aids to apply only to employers
of fifteen or more employees); id. § 42.505(c)(2) (imposing temporary recordkeeping and
disclosure requirements only on those recipients who employ fifty or more people and receive at
least $25,000 from the DOJ); id. § 42.521(c) (exempting providers with less than fifteen
employees from making significant structural alterations in order to comply with accessibility
requirements).
77. See id. §§ 42.540(e), 42.540(k)-(1). A "qualified handicapped person" is one who,
"with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question." Id.
§ 42.540(e)(1).
78. Id § 42.540(h).
79. Id §43.510(a)(1).
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II. A CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 504
A. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits Incorporate the Definition ofEmployer from
Title I into Section 504
The Sixth Circuit tangentially addressed incorporation in Hiler v. Brown.so
Although Hiler concerned supervisor liability under the Rehabilitation Act, the
court's finding, which equated Title I and the Rehabilitation Act in
employment cases, 8' makes it relevant to this Comment. 82 The Sixth Circuit
held that the Rehabilitation Act's antiretaliation provision only allows a
complainant to bring a cause of action against an employer.83 The court noted
that while the Rehabilitation Act had no specific statutory definition of
employer, there was a general understanding that the definition remains
consistent across all of the civil rights statutes as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any
agent of such person."84 A supervisor in his individual capacity does not
80. Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1999). Hiler was a Vietnam veteran
who suffered serious injuries during his service, which resulted in neurological impairment. Id. at
543. He worked as a pipefitter at the Veterans Administration, located in Lexington, Kentucky
and performed his duties competently despite his disability. Id. His disability rendered him
unable to perform well on written exercises under time constraints. Id. Hiler's supervisors
refused to accommodate his disability by modifying the written test used in the management
selection process. Id. Hiler scored poorly on the test and did not receive a recommendation for a
promotion to management. Id at 544. Subsequently, he brought an action for discrimination and
retaliation against his supervisor. Id. The United States District for the Eastern District of
Kentucky found that the action for discrimination could be brought only against the head of the
Veterans Administration, but that the action for retaliation could be brought appropriately against
his supervisors in their individual capacities. Id. The defendants then raised an interlocutory
appeal on the narrow issue of whether suit under the Rehabilitation Act's antiretaliation provision
is proper against a supervisor. Id at 544-45. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that such a
cause of action is improper. Id. at 547.
81. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
82. Hiler, 177 F.3d at 545 n.5 ("The ADA, ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act borrowed the
definition of 'employer' from Title Vll [of the Civil Rights Act of 19641." (citation omitted)).
The opinion discussed the employment provision of Title VII but did not mention Title I or the
incorporation provision of section 504(d). Id at 545. Instead, the court considered whether
Hiler had a remedy against his supervisor. Id. at 544-47. Thus, the court focused on the section
504 provisions that explicitly provide the remedies available under Title VII. See id.; see also
§ 794a(a)(1) (2006).
83. Hiler, 177 F.3d at 547.
84. Id at 545 & n.5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006) (defining employer under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or
more employees"); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5)(A), 12112(a) (2006) (providing the ADA definition of
employer in Title 1); see also Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553-54 (7th Cir. 1995) (equating
the definitions of employer across a number of civil rights statutes). The phrase "affecting
commerce" indicates that these civil rights statutes were passed under federal Commerce Clause
power; in contrast, the Rehabilitation Act was passed under Congress's Spending Clause power
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qualify as an employer or an agent under this definition; thus, in Hiler, the
complainant could not bring a suit against the defendants because they were
the complainant's supervisors, rather than his employer.ss
In Wojewski v. Rapid City Regional Hospital, Inc., the defendant hospital
revoked Dr. Paul Wojewski's medical staff privileges after he exhibited
behavior symptomatic of his diagnosed bipolar disorder.86 The Eighth Circuit
held that Dr. Wojewski, as an independent contractor, was neither protected
under section 504, nor under Title 1.87 Citing Eighth Circuit precedent, the
court provided a three-part test to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled
to recover under section 504.88 This test required a plaintiff to show: "(1) he is
a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was denied the benefits of a
program or activity of a public entity which receives federal funds; and (3) he
and thus may be less compelling. See James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How
the New Federalism May Affect the
Anti-discrimination Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91, 185-86
(2000) (noting that the Commerce Clause basis for the ADA is eroding, and that the voluntary
acceptance of Spending Power conditions underlying section 504 lacks the strength of those
Commerce Power-based, mandatory provisions); see infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
85. Hiler, 177 F.3d at 547.
86. Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'1 Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 2006). As a
member of the medical staff at Rapid City Regional Hospital, Dr. Wojewski had a full staff,
including access to the assistance of hospital employees and use of the hospital's facilities. Id
However, he was classified as an independent contractor because he billed and received payments
directly from the patients. Id. at 341. In addition, he did not receive a W-2 form from the
hospital, did not receive employment benefits, and covered his own Social Security taxes. Id.
Prior to bringing his suit, Dr. Wojewski took a leave of absence for treatment of his bipolar
disorder, and after returning he "experienced an acute [manic] episode while performing
open-heart surgery." Id Concerned for patient safety, the hospital terminated his medical staff
privileges, preventing him from practicing at the hospital. Id
87. Id at 341-42.
88. Id. at 344 (citing Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002)). The court reached the section 504
issue only first after addressing the plaintiffs Title I claim. Id. at 342-43. Wojewski argued that
he was covered under Title I as an employee of the hospital "due to (1) the economic reality of his
circumstances (i.e., that he was completely dependant [sic] upon [the hospital] for his livelihood);
and (2) the heightened level of control and authority that [the hospital] exercised over him." Id at
342. The court found the ADA definition of employee, "an individual employed by an
employer," to be circular and unhelpful in distinguishing between an employee and an
independent contractor. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court instead made the determination by examining the factors supplied by the
Second Restatement of Agency, as the United States Supreme Court had instructed. See id at
342-43 (citing Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989)); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (listing factors that largely relate to the employer's "right
to control" the means by which the work is done, rather than just the end result). Finding that he
did not meet the requirements of an employee, the court treated Dr. Wojewski as an independent
contractor. Wojewski, 450 F.3d at 342-44.
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was discriminated against based on his disability."89 The court focused
primarily on the first prong of the
test-whether or not Dr. Wojewski was a qualified individual with a
disability.90 Although the lower court had ruled that satisfying the first prong
required em ployee status, the Eighth Circuit avoided accepting or rejecting this
conclusion. Instead, the Eighth Circuit ultimately rested its holding on the
determination that Title I and section 504 are substantially similar and, at
times, interchangeable because "[t]he ADA requires an empl o ee-employer
relationship and the Rehabilitation Act contemplates the same." Thus, as an
independent contractor, Dr. Wojewski's section 504 claim failed.93
B. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits Distinguish Title I and Section 504
1. The Tenth Circuit Holds that the Number ofEmployeesls Immaterial to a
Suit Under Section 504
The Tenth Circuit concluded that section 504(d) does not incorporate the
Title I definition of "employer" in a 2002 case, Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, MD.,
P.C.94 Dr. Fred Ray employed Kim Schrader as a medical clerk and
receptionist until she was diagnosed with a brain tumor, whereupon Dr. Ray
terminated her employment.9 5 Schrader brought a claim under section 504 and
Dr. Ray challenged, asserting that he had fewer than fifteen employees and,
thus, did not qualify as an employer under Title I or section 504.96
a. Title I Is Relevant for Substantively Determining Whether
Discrimination Under Section 504 Has Occurred
The Schrader court was persuaded by the language of section 504(d), which
explicitly incorporates the substantive standards from Title I of the ADA "to
determine whether [the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated,"97 and, notably,
89. Wojewski, 450 F.3d at 344 (quoting Gorman, 152 F.3d at 911) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
90. Id. at 344-45 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006)).
91. Id. at 345. The court found that Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d
768 (8th Cir. 1987), did not control because the plaintiff in the case was unquestionably an
employee, and thus the decision did not hinge on the determination of whether the first prong
required employee status. See Wojewski, 450 F.3d at 345.
92. Id
93. Id
94. Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968, 969 (10th Cir. 2002).
95. Id at 970; see also supra text accompanying notes 1-15 (providing factual background).
Schrader had a history of illness, including diagnoses of kidney cancer in 1984 and a brain tumor
in 1997. Id. Her employment terminated after an extended absence from work to undergo kidney
surgery, despite Dr. Ray's assurances that her job was safe. Id
96. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 970.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2006); see also McDonald v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, Polk Ctr.,
62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995) (indicating that "the substantive standards for determining liability
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makes no mention of incorporating Title I when determining "whether an
employer is even subject to the Rehabilitation Act in the first instance."98 The
Tenth Circuit determined that the plain language of section 504(a) clearly
covers "any program or activity,"99 and is not limited to the
employer-employee relationship. 00
Like the Eighth Circuit in Wojewski, the Tenth Circuit provided its own test
for determining if a violation of section 504 has occurred.101 A plaintiff must
show: "(1) [he] is handicapped under the Act; (2) he is 'otherwise qualified' to
participate in the program; (3) the program receives federal financial
assistance; and (4) the program discriminates against plaintiff."1 02 The Eighth
Circuit's characterization of the prima facie case requirements under section
504 differs from that in Wojewski, particularly concerning the meaning of
"qualified individuals."' 03 While the Wojewski court cited the direct language
from section 504(a) in the first prong of its test,104 the Tenth Circuit in
Schrader clarified that language to avoid any confusion as to the meaning of an
"otherwise qualified individual," and interpreted the intent of the statute to
cover those individuals who are "'otherwise qualified' to participate in the
program."105
b. Finding the Number ofEmployees To Be Immaterial as a General Rule
Is Essential for Coherence Within the Statutory Scheme ofSection 504
The Tenth Circuit also analyzed section 504(c) in response to claims that the
Rehabilitation Act was not designed to protect workers outside of the
are the same" in both statutes). For example, accommodations that are considered "fundamental
alteration[s)," and thus not reasonable for employers to provide, are generally the same under
both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 971 (2004)
(citing Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)). Southeastern Community College v. Davis
is considered the most frequently cited case for the "fundamental alteration" standard under both
statutes. Ball supra, at 971.
98. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 972 (quoting Johnson v. N.Y. Hosp., 897 F. Supp. 83, 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Schrader, 296 F.3d at 971 n.2.
100. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 975.
101. Id. at 971 (quoting Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir.
1999)).
102. Id. (quoting Powers, 184 F.3d at 1151).
103. Compare id. (citing Powers, 184 F.3d at 1151), with Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'l
Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 344 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 911 (8th
Cir. 1998), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002)).
104. Wojewski, 450 F.3d at 344 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
105. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 971 (quoting Powers, 189 F.3d at 1151). In fact, Title I defines
qualified individual as "an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires,"
with no mention of other statutory qualifications. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 2009).
[Vol. 60:11158
2011] State-Funded Discrimination: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 1159
employer-employee relationship as defined by Title 1.106 The court focused on
the purpose of section 504(c) to protect small providers from undertaking
cost-prohibitive structural alterations when attempting to accommodate
persons with disabilities.1 07  Regulations enforcing this subsection define a
small provider as a recipient of federal funds who has fewer than fifteen
employees. 08 Consequently, the court in Schrader determined that the section
504(c) exemption from making significant structural alterations for small
providers would be superfluous if the incorporation provision of section 504(d)
was held to incorporate the "fifteen or more employee" definition from Title I
into section 504 as a whole.109
c. Legislative History and Congressional Intent Show that Title I and
Section 504 Are Separate and Distinct
Upon reviewing the legislative history of the 1992 amendment that created
section 504(d), the Tenth Circuit held that it was Congress's intent to clarify
"the definitions of reasonable accommodations and discrimination"1 10 while
maintaining the broad coverage of section 504 over "any individual who wants
to work."' Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended
to place limitations on section 504 in any way, or, specifically, that it intended
to limit worker recovery to those within the Title I definition of an employment
relationship. 112
106. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 972-73. Section 504(c) provides the following: "Small providers
are not required . . . to make significant structural alterations to their existing facilities for the
purpose of assuring program accessibility, if alternative means of providing the services are
available." 29 U.S.C. § 794(c).
107. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 972-73 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(c)).
108. See id. at 973; e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15b.18(c) (2010); see also 28 C.F.R. § 42.521(c) (2010);
41 C.F.R. § 101-8.309(d) (2010) (each providing that "[i]f a recipient with fewer than fifteen
employees finds, after consultation with a handicapped person seeking its services, that there is
no method of complying with [the accessibility requirement] other than by making a significant
alteration in its existing facilities, the recipient may, as an alternative, refer the handicapped
person to other providers of those services that are accessible at no additional cost to the
handicapped person").
109. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 973.
110. Id. at 974 (quoting 138 CONG. REc. 31,523 (1992) (statement of Sen. Harkin)).
111. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 102-357, at 6 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712,
3717).
112. Id. at 974. Incorporating portions of Title I into section 504 served a number of
essential purposes for Congress, such as solidifying the ADA's national mandate, clarifying
judicial interpretation of the two separate but related statutes, and increasing the breadth of the
Rehabilitation Act. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat.
4344 ("An Act to revise and extend the programs of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . ."); S.
REP. No. 102-357, at 2, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712, 3713 (addressing the desire to
conform the "precepts and values" of both statutes, which included the ADA's national mandate
to eliminate disability discrimination); cf Cooper, supra note 61, at 1223-24 (illustrating the
serious problems that resulted from diverging judicial interpretations of Rehabilitation Act
mandates). Interpretation of the 1992 amendments in a manner that would limit the otherwise
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In challenging the characterization of the two statutes as having similar
coverage, the court highlighted the quid pro quo relationship inherent in the
Rehabilitation Act, but not found in Title I.1 The court acknowledged that
Title I balances the goals of eliminating discrimination and avoiding undue
cost burdens by precludin small businesses-those with less than fifteen
employees-from liability. The court further observed that aside from
businesses with fewer than fifteen employees, no organization can avoid
compliance with the mandating strictures of Title 1; however, any entity can
avoid Rehabilitation Act liability if it chooses not to receive federal funding.i15
In effect, federal funding is provided in exchange for an agreement by the
recipient to abide by the Rehabilitation Act's stricter prohibition of
discrimination.116
2. The Ninth Circuit Follows the Tenth Circuit in Applying Section 504 to
Independent Contractors
In Fleming v. Yuma Regional Medical Center, the Ninth Circuit went a step
further than the Tenth Circuit had in Schrader by holding that the
Rehabilitation Act is applicable outside of the traditional employer-employee
relationship.1 7 While Schrader applied section 504 protection to employment
outside of the Title I definition of an employer-employee relationship, 8 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that section 504 also extends to cover an independent
contractor suing for discrimination.119
broad coverage of section 504 would be entirely contrary to the clear legislative intent
surrounding the passage of the ADA and the 1992 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act.
113. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 974 (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632 n.13
(1984), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, sec. 4,
§ 504, 102 Stat. 28, 29 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006))).
114. Id. (citing Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999)). Congress
was convinced that abiding by the demands of Title I would be quite expensive for many
organizations and prohibitively so for small providers. See supra note 70. Independent
contractors were not protected either, giving small businesses even more freedom to avoid the
harsh mandates of Title I. See Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'1 Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th
Cir. 2006).
115. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 974. The mandatory nature of Title I and the voluntary nature of
the Rehabilitation Act result from their varied constitutional underpinnings, leading to this
discrepancy in scope. See supra note 82; see infra notes 124-27.
116. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 974 (citing Darrone, 465 U.S. at 633).
117. See Fleming v. Yuma Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied
130 S. Ct. 3468 (2010).
118. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 975.
119. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 939. Dr. Fleming, an anesthesiologist suffering from sickle cell
anemia, applied for a position with the defendant, Yuma Regional Medical Center (Yuma). Id at
940. After becoming aware of Dr. Fleming's health condition, Yuma indicated that they would
be unable to make particular accommodations for him, which resulted in Dr. Fleming declining
the offer and suing for employment discrimination. Id. The district court determined that Dr.
Fleming was an independent contractor. Id
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a. Once the Initial Determination ofFederal Funding Is Made, Section
504 Covers a Much Broader Range ofPeople and Entities than Title I
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by comparing the scope of section 504
against that of Title I. Section 504 broadly covers any "otherwise qualified
individual" in any "program or activity."l 21 Additionally, section 504 broadly
defines "program or activity" as "'all of the operations of' state
instrumentalities, colleges and universities, local education agencies, and 'an
entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole
proprietorship."'l22 On the other hand, Title I more narrowly covers only the
"aspects of the employer-employee relationship."1 23  The Ninth Circuit
explained the differing scopes of the two statutes by providing a constitutional
rationale, indicating that the ADA was passed under Congress's Commerce
Clause ower,124 while the Rehabilitation Act was passed under the Spending
Clause' F power. 126
120. Id. at 941-42.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006); Fleming, 587 F.3d at 941-42 (noting also that the
Rehabilitation Act's scope is broader than the ADA's scope); see supra note 14 (indicating that
Congress intended this language to be broad when it superseded the Supreme Court's decision in
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, sec. 3, § 908, 102 Stat. 28, 28 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2006)).
122. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 942 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)); see also Sharer v. Oregon, 581
F.3d 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting Congress's intent to broaden the definition); Haybarger
v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (acknowledging the
Third Circuit's shift toward broad interpretation).
123. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 942 (citing Zimmerman v. Or. Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169,
1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1999)).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (indicating that one purpose of
the ADA was to "invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities"); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2006)
(defining an employer under the ADA as one who works in an industry affecting commerce);
United States v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 321 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he ADA is an
exercise of Commerce Clause power. . . .").
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (providing coverage over all
programs and activities receiving federal assistance); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George
Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 491 (4th Cir. 2005) ("Like Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Title
IX of the Education Amendments, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 'invokes Congress' power
under the Spending Clause . . . to place conditions on the grant of federal funds."' (quoting
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2002) (internal citation omitted)).
126. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 941 n.3.
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b. Incorporation that Would Limit the Scope of Section 504 Requires
Explicit Language
Next in its analysis, the Ninth Circuit addressed the incorporation provision
in section 504(d).127 Because section 504(d) only mentions using the
"standards" of Title I and does not explicitly incorporate Title 1, the Ninth
Circuit found the Supreme Court's decision in Consolidated Rail Corporation
v. Darrone to be instructive.128 In Darrone, the Court held that, although
section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act referenced Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as providing "remedies, procedures, and rights"' 29 for those
covered under section 504, this incorporation did not mean that all other Title
VI limitations were incorporated into a section 504 claim as well.13 0 The lack
of any specific incorporation of language from Title VI convinced the Supreme
Court that Congress did not intend to include the limitations from Title VI in
the Rehabilitation Act.131
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Fleming also found support in its own
precedent: in Zimmerman v. Oregon Department of Justice,l 2 the court had
addressed whether a reference to section 505 in Title II of the ADA
incorporated the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA.' 33 The court held that Title
II neither expressly nor impliedly incorporates the Rehabilitation Act's
127. Id at 942 (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632 (1984), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28; Zimmerman,
170 F.3d at 1179 (attempting to determine when selective incorporation is appropriate).
128. Id at 942-43 (citing Darrone, 465 U.S. at 632). Darrone addressed a suit by a train
conductor who was fired after losing his left hand and forearm. Darrone, 465 U.S. at 628. After
his accident, the company fired him without first making a determination that he was unfit to
work. Id. Consolidated Rail's defense relied on the argument that the incorporation of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act into section 505's provision of remedies available under section 504
renders other provisions from Title VI incorporated as well. Id. at 631-32. In particular, the
corporation argued that section 604 of Title VI should be incorporated into section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, thereby limiting the scope of coverage to "'employment practice[s] . . . where
a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment."' Id at 631
(alterations in original) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 §, 604, 78 Stat.
241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1982))).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).
130. See Darrone, 465 U.S. at 631-33.
131. 1dat632-33.
132. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 943 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Zimmerman v. Or. Dep't of Justice, 170
F.3d 1169, 1179 (1999)). In Zimmerman, the plaintiff argued that Title II of the ADA had
incorporated section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, and thus Title It applied to employment
discrimination. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1179. Similar to Darrone, the appellee argued for
incorporation as following from the enumeration of remedies in Title 11 as the "remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29 [the Rehabilitation Act]." Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994)). The court disagreed, concluding that
section 505 is neither explicitly nor implicitly incorporated into Title II as a result of this
language. Id. at 1179-80.
133. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1179.
1162 [Vol. 60:1
2011] State-Funded Discrimination: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 1163
"substantive employment provisions."l 34  In Fleming, fearing that total
incorporation would narrow the scope of the Rehabilitation Act prohibitively,
the Ninth Circuit expanded on Zimmerman, stating that the mandate of section
504 "'naturally encompasses the entire operation of the program or activity, for
its federal funding may well flow into compensation for employees,' and we
would add, for independent contractors as well., 35 Thus, the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have avoided limiting the scope of the statutory scheme without clear
congressional intent.136
c. Congress Never Intended for the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1992 to Limit the Scope ofSection 504
The Ninth Circuit directly addressed its concern that, should the rationale of
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits prevail, the adoption of subsection (d) would
have limited the scope of section 504 as a whole-a result that Congress would
not likely have intended.' 3 7 Statutory interpretation must be done deliberately,
and the court "'must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute
to a different statute without careful and critical examination."" 38 Citing the
Tenth Circuit in Schrader, the court distinguished between applying the
substantive standards of Title I, which section 504 incorporates, and
determining who is actually covered by section 504, which does not involve a
Title I analysis.' 39 Responding to Yuma's argument that the circuit court was
bound by the Supreme Court's recent holding that the fifteen-employee rule is
substantive in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,140 the Ninth Circuit found the case
inapposite because the issue of whether the definition of employer is a
"substantive ingredient" of the Act, rather than a jurisdictional element, has no
bearing on determining whether that definition is involved in the Act's
substantive, rather than procedural, standards.141 In Arbaugh, the Supreme
Court held that the definition of employer was substantive rather than
134. Id. at lt 80.
135. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 943 (quoting Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1181).
136. See Darrone, 465 U.S. at 633-35 (indicating that the Supreme Court has been wary
regarding the incorporation of provisions limiting the scope of a statute without express or
implied congressional intent).
137. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 943 ("Without additional direction from Congress, we are hesitant
to reduce the express scope of the Rehabilitation Act by wholesale adoption of definitions from
another act." (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009)).
138. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393
(2008)).
139. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 944 (quoting Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968,
972 (10th Cir. 2002)).
140. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006) (finding that a fifteen or more
employee requirement was substantive, for determining whether an employer was subject to suit
under Title VII, as opposed to jurisdictional).
141. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 944-45. The court illustrates the point in an aphoristic footnote:
"As a simple example, one must recognize when seeking directions that right rather than left
doesn't necessarily also mean right rather than wrong." Id. at 945 n.5.
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jurisdictional for the purpose of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction over
the claim.142 The Ninth Circuit did not face this distinction in Fleming, where
the issue was "whether the ADA's definition of employer is part of the ADA's
substantive standard for determining when discrimination occurs.
143
d. The Total Incorporation of Title I Would Result in Statutory
Inconsistency
The Ninth Circuit went on to address the need for consistency within the
statutory scheme of section 504, and held that total incorporation would create
a number of inconsistencies between section 504 and provisions incorporated
from Title 1.144 For example, the court indicated that section 504 and Title I
each independently have provisions related to alcoholism and infectious
disease.145 Total incorporation requires that either Title I provisions displace
section 504 provisions on the same subject matter, or section 504 claims meet
the standards of both statutory schemes. 46 While admittedly not comparing all
attributes of the two statutes, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress clearly
intended to create "two parallel schemes" with differing scope and
application. 147
e. The Plain Language of the Rehabilitation Act Is Broad Enough to
Cover Independent Contractors
The Ninth Circuit, challenging the argument by the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits that selective incorporation would impermissibly extend the scope of
section 504, held that the plain language is broad enough to include
independent contractors. 148 The court concluded by acknowledging the Sixth
and Eighth Circuit's strongest argument-that the plain language of section
504(d), directly referring to Title I "as such sections relate to employment," 149
indicates Congress's intent to incorporate the meaning of employment from
Title I into section 504.150 While recognizing the plausibility of this argument,
142. Id. at 944 (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503-04). In Arbaugh, Justice Ruth B. Ginsburg
framed the issue before the Court as "whether the numerical qualification contained in Title Vii's
definition of 'employer' affects federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction or, instead, delineates a
substantive ingredient of a Title VII claim for relief." Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503.
143. See Fleming, 587 F.3d at 945.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(C)(v) (2006) (providing that alcoholism is not a "disability"
for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act); id. § 705(20)(D) (providing that infectious diseases is
also not a covered disability); 42 U.S.C. § 12113(e) (Supp. Ill 2009) (providing ADA guidelines
for infectious diseases); 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (providing ADA guidelines
for alcohol and drug use).
146. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 945.
147. Id.
148. Id
149. 29 U.S.C. 794(d) (2006).
150. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 946.
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the Ninth Circuit ultimately dismissed the reasoning as an interpretation based
inappropriatel. on judicial expedience rather than the best reading of the Act
as a whole.'s Consistent with its analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that Mr.
Fleming could properly bring a claim against the medical center under section
504 even though he was admittedly not an employee.1 52
III. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits Incorporated the ADA's "Employer" into the
Rehabilitation Act with Little Supporting Law
1. The Sixth Circuit Inappropriately Expanded the Scope ofIncorporation
to Include a Restrictive Definition of "Employer"
In holding that an employee could not bring his anti-retaliation action
against his supervisors, the Sixth Circuit drew a logical, but perhaps
overreaching, conclusion that "individuals who do not otherwise meet the
[Title VII] definition of 'employer' cannot be held liable under the
Rehabilitation Act's antiretaliation provision." 53
The Sixth Circuit noted that the "remedies, procedures, and rights" available
to a federal employee under the Rehabilitation Act are enumerated in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.154 The court then quoted Title VII, which
permits actions against an "'employer, employment agency, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee,"' when discussing the remedies
available for retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act.155 After analyzing the
incorporation of this provision into the Rehabilitation Act, the court concluded
that an individual cannot be held liable for retaliation under the Act if that
individual falls outside the scope of Title VII's definition of "employer." 5 6
However, this conclusion was improperly drawn considering that Title VII
actually provides for causes of action against more than just "an employer," as
noted above. Because the issue in Hiler was whether supervisors could be
held personally liable for retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, the court
could have resolved the case on narrower grounds by finding that these
particular supervisors did not fall into the broader category set forth in Title
151. Id. ("[O]ur own administrative convenience is not a factor in determining what Congress
meant .....
152. Id.
153. Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 1999).
154. Id at 545 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1999)).
155. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1999)).
156. Id. at 545-46. Titles I and VII of the ADA utilize identical definitions of the term,
providing that an employer is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who as
[fifteen] or more employees...." Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006), with id §12111(5)(A).
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (permitting causes of action against "an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs").
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ViI. 5 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held that permissible defendants must
fall under the stringent statutory definition of "employer,"l 59 a conclusion
which, in consideration of the scope of this case, was unwarranted because
"employer" represents only a portion of the broader category provided by Title
VII.
The Sixth Circuit never truly addressed the issue of whether section 504
incorporates the statutory definition of employer from Title I and other civil
rights statutes, but rather assumed it as fact.161 The court rebuffed the
plaintiffs claim by highlighting the distinction between employing entities and
individual supervisors, finding that civil rights statutes only intend to assign
liability to the former.162 The court reasoned that Title VII did not contemplate
supervisor liability because supervisors lacked the appropriate authority to
satisfy the remedies originally made available under the Title, which include
reinstatement and back-pay. However, this rationale does not explain why
an employer who has less than fifteen employees or hires only independent
contractors is free from liability, while an employer with sixteen employees
and no independent contractors may be held liable to all of his workers. The
ease with which the Sixth Circuit disposed of Hiler was indicative of the
simplicity of the issue presented as framed by the court.' 6 The question of
158. See Hiler, 177 F.3d at 543.
159. Id at 547.
160. Cf Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119-20 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (prescribing
that the Court exercise judicial restraint and limit its review to the narrowly presented issue
regarding the limits of congressional power, rather than pass judgment on the wisdom of
congressional action); see supra notes 156, 158-59 (discussing the category of actionable
entities). Although referring to a constitutional issue decided by the Supreme Court, Justice Felix
Frankfurter delivered wise advice on separation of powers and the role of the judiciary when he
stated that "it is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious
regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect to its own
notions of what is wise or politic." Id. at 120. Thus, the Sixth Circuit should also refrain from
broadly declaring policy when a narrower disposition is available.
161. See Hiler, 177 F.3d at 545-47, 545 n.5 (holding "that individuals who do not otherwise
meet the statutory definition of 'employer' cannot be held liable under the Rehabilitation Act's
anti-retaliation provision," but reaching this decision without any supporting analysis other than
stating in a footnote that the Rehabilitation Act "borrowed the definition of 'employer' from Title
VII").
162. See id at 546-47.
163. Id (stating that, historically, relief was limited to equitable relief or back-pay, remedies
which a supervisor traditionally would not have the ability or authority to provide).
164. See Carlson, supra note 69, at 297 (indicating that the distinction between employees
and independent contractors is one that American society has grappled with for quite some time,
without ever reaching a satisfactory conclusion).
165. See Hiler, 177 F.3d at 546 (indicating that the appellee's argument relied too heavily on
analogizing to certain remedies available under the Rehabilitation Act that could also be provided
by individuals, an argument that the court quickly dismissed as contrary to "a long line of
precedent"). Because the discrimination claim in Hiler sought to find a supervisor personally
liable for the discrimination, the appellee first had to address the additional threshold issue of
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whether to incorporate the definition of employer from Title I or Title VII,
which the Hiler court so casually assumed, is actually much more complex,166
2. The Eighth Circuit Treated Section 504 and Title I as Identical in
Employment Coverage "Absent Authority to the Contrary"
The Eighth Circuit dealt with an issue more directly on point, but provided
an even less persuasive argument than the Sixth Circuit in Hiler. 167 In
Wojewksi the Eighth Circuit noted that "[t]he parties cite[d] no case that has
decided whether a nonemployee can be a qualified individual under § 504."168
As a result, the court denied the plaintiffs section 504 claim, thus
incorporating the Title I definition of employer due to the "similarity between
Title I and the Rehabilitation Act, absent authority to the contrary."l 6
Alarmingly, the Eighth Circuit's decision lacked justification of its
affirmation of the district court's decision apart from the similarities between
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. 170 The Eighth Circuit held that the district
court's rationale was inapplicable because the district court relied on a case
that dealt with a plaintiff who was unquestionably an employee.171 The Eighth
whether the supervisor was a proper party to the suit in the first place. Id. (indicating that a
supervisor sued in his personal capacity does not qualify as an employer under any analogous
civil rights statutes).
166. Compare supra notes 80 and 82 (describing the issue presented to the court in Hiler),
with Fleming v. Yuma Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 941-46 (9th Cir. 2009) (providing a
thorough analysis of the incorporation issue), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 3468 (2010). Early attempts
to enforce some of the Act's requirements elucidated the complexity of the issues regarding
Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence. See O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 128-29. These issues were
mainly due to the fact that Congress provided no independent enforcement authority for the
implementation of the Act's provisions, leaving it to the courts to interpret the Act as
implemented by the various regulatory bodies. See id. This led to a great deal of "judicial
experimentation." See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text (examining the Eighth Circuit's
argument in Wojewski).
168. Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'1 Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 344 (8th Cir. 2006). This was
a failure by the plaintiffs attorney who neglected to analogize the case to Schrader, which was
decided four years earlier and perhaps could have been useful. See generally Schrader v. Fred A.
Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 2002). While not a suit by an independent contractor,
Schrader addressed the broader question in Wojewski of whether section 504 contemplates the
ADA's employer-employee relationship. See id at 971-95. The plaintiff in Wojewski focused on
fringe issues and even cited a case that never reached the merits because the claim was barred by
the statute of limitations. See Wojewski, 450 F.3d at 344-45.
169. Wojewski, 450 F.3d at 345.
170. See id
171. Id. The Eighth Circuit indicated that the district court decision rested upon the
conclusion that "a qualified individual with a disability," as provided in section 504(a), must be
an employee to be "qualified." Id. (citing Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d
768, 771 (8th Cir. 1987)). The district court cited language from Beauford indicating that
"'section 504 was designed to prohibit discrimination within the ambit of an employment
relationship' in coming to their conclusion that only employees may bring suit under section
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Circuit, however, upon disregarding this rationale, did not supply any
additional precedent when it affirmed the district court's decision to appl the
Title I definition of employer to Mr. Wojewski's section 504 claim. In
addition, the Eighth Circuit did not address whether it supported the district
court's assertion that "a qualified individual with a disability" must be an
employee.173 As a result, the Eighth Circuit raised, but did not answer, a major
question regarding one of the premises of the district court's decision. 174
B. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits Provided an Extensive Analysis of the
Statute's Plain Language, Case Law, and Legislative History.
1. The Plain Language of the Statute Supports the Conclusion that No
Specific Employment Relationship Was Contemplated in Section 504
In Schrader, decided four years prior to Wojewski, the Tenth Circuit
addressed the "cualified individual" question that had been avoided by the
Eighth Circuit. Y The court asserted that the "otherwise qualified
individual" 76 language should be interpreted as meaning an individual who is
"otherwise qualified to participate in the program." 77 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the number of employees has no bearing on whether one of
those employees is a qualified individual.' 78 The regulations that enforce
section 504 support this interpretation; for instance, a Department of Health
and Human Services regulation provides that an otherwise qualified individual
is one "who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the job in question." 79  The use of the word "qualified" is
intended to focus on the person's qualifications to perform the task, rather than
encompassing any other potential statutory qualifications.' 80
504. Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'1 Hosp., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (W.D.S.D. 2005)
(emphasis added by the court) (quoting Beauford, 831 F.2d at 771).
172. Wojewski, 450 F.3d at 345.
173. Id.
174. Id at 344-45.
175. See Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968, 973-74 (10th Cir. 2002)
(indicating that, with regard to the adoption of section 504(d), the issue of who was intended to be
covered by the statute "has been resolved separately," and thus the incorporation of Title I was
not intended to affect the matter at hand).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
177. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 971 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powers v. MJB
Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1151) (listing requirements of a prima facie case under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
178. See id at 971-72.
179. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(l)(1) (2010).
180. See Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1987)
("[S]ection 504 was designed to prohibit discrimination within the ambit of an employment
relationship in which the employee is potentially able to do the job in question."); see supra note
71 (listing regulations of a number of agencies implementing the Rehabilitation Act that interpret
"qualified individual" as one who is qualified to participate in the particular program or activity).
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Section 504(a) extends coverage to any "program or activity" receiving
federal funds.' 8 1 As noted in Schrader, the definition of "program or activity"
enumerates a broad range of entities, but most importantly, it includes sole
proprietorships.182 Nothing in section 504 indicates that small providers are
exempt; 1 in fact, the regulations enforcing section 504 imply that small
providers are covered in most circumstances.
An "otherwise qualified individual" is thus not required to meet additional
qualifications beyond the ability to perform the required work, and coverage of
programs and activities is not limited beyond the explicit provisions of section
504. 185
2. The Similarities Between Section 504 and Title I Are Not Dispositive, and
the Distinctions Are Vast
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits made strong arguments opposing the Eighth
Circuit's holding that the similarities between the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA compel the conclusion that section 504 incorporates the Title I definition
of "employer."' 86 Notably, the Rehabilitation Act, as a product of the spending
power, does not apply unless the discriminating entity has accepted federal
funding; the ADA, as a product of the commerce power, requires no such
voluntary action to apply. 1 Further, the determination that the constitutional
underpinnings of both statutes are different evinces the scopes of these statutes,
despite assertions by the Eighth Circuit to the contrary.' 88
181. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
182. Schrader, 296 F.3d at 973 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)).
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(f) (2010) (indicating that small providers are not required
to provide auxiliary aids when doing so would significantly impair the ability to provide benefits
and services, which implies that the regulations are otherwise generally applicable to small
providers).
185. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
186. Compare Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'1 Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 395 (8th Cir. 2006)
(finding the Rehabilitation Act inapplicable to independent contractors), with Fleming v. Yuma
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 941-42, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2009) (incorporating the substantive
standards from Title I into the Rehabilitation Act, but allowing suit by an independent contractor
because the language of the Rehabilitation Act is much broader than Title I), cert. denied 130 S.
Ct. 3468 (2010), and Schrader, 296 F.3d at 975 (holding that the ADA's definition of employer
was not incorporated into section 504).
187. See Schrader, 296 F.3d at 974; see supra notes 84, 124-26 and accompanying text
(discussing the differing constitutional underpinnings of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act).
188. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 941-42, 942 n.3; see supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text
(describing the fundamental constitutional differences between the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act that play a critical role in their individual application and scope).
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3. Legislative Intent Further Indicates that Each Statute Serves a Different
but Important Role in Society
While both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA serve the interests of the
disabled, the initial purpose and scope of each bill differed slightly.189  The
Rehabilitation Act originated after World War I to address the need for
increased services benefiting the physically disabled to ultimately incorporate
them back into society.190 The ADA, however, began as a true civil rights
statute, explicitly prohibiting discriminatory conduct against the disabled. 91
Although there has been a great deal of overlap in terms of coverage and
protection, the Rehabilitation Act had an initial focus on rehabilitating the
individual, while the ADA focused more on curing society of its ills. 19 2
4. The Supreme Court Has Historically Prohibited Incorporation that
Restricts the Scope of Section 504
Supreme Court precedent supports the Ninth and Tenth Circuit
determinations that section 504 does not incorporate the Title I definition of
employer. 193 In Darrone, the Supreme Court refused to limit the scope of the
189. Compare supra notes 43-51 (discussing the Rehabilitation Act's initial focus on curing
the person of his or her disability), with supra notes 66-68 (discussing the ADA's more
"humanitarian approach" and greater emphasis on preventing discrimination against the disabled
in society). Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act as a means to train those who could not
work, at least under society's perception at the time, and allow them to reenter mainstream
society. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-244, at 3 (1973). On the other hand, the ADA was designated as a
"national mandate for the elimination of discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
190. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The history behind the Rehabilitation Act,
including precursory statutes dating back to 1920, indicates that the intent of those programs was,
first and foremost, to rehabilitate physically disabled veterans returning home from war, and to
return them to productive members of society. See Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 107, 40
Stat. 617, 617 (1918) ("To provide for vocational rehabilitation and return to civil employment of
disabled person discharged from the military or naval forces.").
191. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006 & Supp. 111 2009). In general, the ADA intended "to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2006).
192. See supra note 189. As an analogy, prima facie cases of civil battery and criminal
assault have a number of overlapping elements and serve similar interests of the plaintiff and
victim in either case. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (finding liability
for battery when an actor "intending to cause harmful or offensive contact with the person of the
other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and . . . a harmful contact
with the person of the other directly or indirectly results"), with MODEL PENAL CODE §
211.1(1)(a) (1962) (finding someone guilty of simple assault if he "attempts to cause or
purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another"). Nevertheless, the civil
cause of action is brought by the injured party and aims to make the plaintiff whole again,
whereas the criminal cause of action is brought by the state for the greater good of society.
193. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1984) (holding that
incorporation limiting the scope of the Rehabilitation Act must include specific language
indicating congressional intent to incorporate such a limitation), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, 29 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 799 (2006)). Many statutory provisions specifically incorporate the enforcement
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Rehabilitation Act by incorporating restrictive language from Title VI without
explicit language in section 504 requiring as much. 194  Such precedent is
helpful in resolving the question of Title I incorporation because, although
section 504(d) incorporates standards from Title I, there is no language
explicitly limiting the scope of section 504 in any way.195 Following Supreme
Court precedent, section 504(d) does not incorporate the Title I
employer-employee relationship because such incorporation would limit
section 504's plain lanuage and there is no explicit language permitting any
limitation to that effect.
5. Although It Improperly Framed the Issue, the Ninth Circuit Was
Persuasive in Its Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Fleming improperly broadened the scope of
the question presented, and inadequately addressed a significant argument in
favor of incorporating Title I into section 504.197 The appellee, favoring
incorporation of the ADA's employer-employee relationship, argued that
"[s]ection 504(d) plainly refers us to Title I of the ADA 'as such sections refer
to employment."' 98 The court, choosing to avoid this argument, indicated
that, even though 'jot-for-jot" incorporation provides easier enforcement, "our
own administrative convenience is not a factor in determining what Congress
meant."l99 However, the appellee in Fleming did not ask for total
incorporation and never explicitly arued for incorporation of any definition
other than employer and employee. Thus, the Fleming court's finding that
total incorporation would lead to inconsistencies within the Rehabilitation Act
inaccurately characterized the issue.201 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
exhaustively discussed the narrower incorporation issue;202 thus, its overbroad
provisions and available remedies from other statutes. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (2006)
(incorporating the remedies available under Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act into section 501 of
the Rehabilitation Act and the remedies available under Title VI into section 504); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(c) (2006) (incorporating the remedies and enforcement procedures from Title I into the
antiretaliation provisions of the ADA).
194. Darrone, 465 U.S. at 631-32.
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)(2006). Section 504(d) of the Rehabilitation Act briefly
mentions that the standards from Title I will be used, yet it does not elaborate on the extent of any
incorporation. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, sec. 506,
§ 504(d), 106 Stat. 4344, 4428 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)).
196. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
198. Fleming, 587 F.3d at 946 Fleming v. Yuma Reg'l Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 3468 (2010).
199. Id
200. Appellee of Yuma Anesthesia Medical Services' Answering Brief at 9-17, Fleming, 587
F.3d at 938 (No. 07-16427) (arguing that the definitions from Title I generally should apply to
section 504, but only discussing the definitions of employer and employee specifically).
201. See Fleming, 587 F.3d at 945.
202. See supra Part II.B.2.
Catholic University Law Review
characterization of the appellee's argument should not negate an otherwise
strong analysis of the actual issue presented.
C. The Implications ofDenying Antidiscrimination Rights to a Growing
Segment of the American Workforce Require that the Supreme Court Provide a
Bright-Line Rule
Due to the current economic crisis, an escalating number of companies and
203organizations depend upon independent contractors. State laws vary on who
qualifies as an independent contractor, but organizations are generally not
required to provide health or other benefits to these workers regardless of the
size of the organization.204 Organizations can avoid Raying employment taxes
by classifying workers as independent contractors.2 5 This has incentivized
many organizations to lay off employees, or reclassify them as independent
contractors, leading to increased enforcement of policies against worker
206misclassification nationwide. With this basic framework of incentives
203. See Nathan Eddy, Report: Independent Contractor Usage Rises to Record Level,
EWEEK.COM, May 6, 2009, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Midmarket/Report-Independent-
Contractor-Usage-Rises-to-Record-Level-759243/ (reporting on an increase in hiring of
independent contractors among small businesses).
204. Lisa Hordwedel Barton, Comment, Reconciling the Independent Contractor Versus
Employee Dilemma: A Discussion of Current Developments as They Relate to Employee Benefits
Plans, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (2002). Although state laws vary, the right-to-control test
is the most widely adopted standard. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003) (defining an employee as "an agent whose principal controls or has
the right to control the manner and means of the agent's performance of work"). This test is also
used by the IRS in determining whether a worker is an employee for tax purposes. See
Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, IRS.GOv (last updated Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=99921,00.html.
205. Employment Taxes and Classifying Workers, IRS.GOV (last updated Apr. 1, 2010),
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=177092,00.html ("[I]ndependent contractors are
responsible for reporting and paying their own Social Security and income taxes."); see also
Rosano v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 681, 689-90 (1966) (holding that the petitioner was not required to
cover her own self-employment taxes because she was under the "direction, supervision, and
control" of the establishment in which she worked, and thus was considered an employee of the
establishment).
206. See DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FY 2011, BUDGET IN BRIEF 1-2 (2010), available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2011 /PDF/bib.pdf (providing $25 million for a worker
misclassification initiative and making misclassification a violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), punishable by those penalties available under the FLSA); see also, Robert C. Nagle,
Employers Facing Increased Scrutiny Over Worker Classification, HRHERO.COM, July 15, 2010,
http://hrhero.com/hl/articles/2010/07/15/employers-facing-increased-scrutiny-over-worker-
classification/ (discussing the implications of the Department of Labor crackdown on worker
misclassification); Press Release, Wage and Hour Div., U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Labor
Department Investigation Results in Court Order Against Landscaping Companies for Wrongly
Misclassifying Employees, $173,000 in Back Wages (Oct. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/medialpress/whdpress
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already in place, and an increasing number of organizations relying on the
labor of independent contractors, more and more workers will find themselves
susceptible to discrimination and without recourse under either Title I or
section 504 unless their jurisdiction follows the path of the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits.207
D. The Disabled Community Has Made Strides, but Entering the Third
Decade of the ADA Continued Protection Must Be Mandated
According to a study in 1996 by the National Council on Disabilities, an
estimated forty-nine million Americans suffer from physical or mental
disabilities. 20 8 This qualified the disabled as the largest minority group in the
United States, according to the 1995 Census, surpassing African Americans
and the elderly.209 The disabled should have a great deal of political and social
exposure due to their numbers, and due to the fact that many become disabled
210later in life as a result of injury or illness during adolescence or adulthood.
Nevertheless, the disabled have historically been considered the "other,"
separated from society, and often face doubt as to their "very humanity." 211 As
recently as 2005, the National Council on Disabilities recognized the great
strides that have been made by the disabled in numerous areas, while also
VB3.asp?pressdoc=Midwest/20101004.xml (describing the penalties assessed against two
landscaping companies for violating the FLSA when they neglected to pay workers overtime due
to their alleged status as independent contractors).
207. It is important to note the potential impact on numerous small businesses if the Supreme
Court ultimately holds that section 504 is applicable outside of the Title I defined
employer-employee relationship. This decision would place onerous burdens on small businesses
under section 504, which mirrors those burdens Senator Hatch feared would result from Title III
of the ADA without an exception for such businesses. See 135 CONG. REC. 19835 (statement of
Sen. Hatch). Nevertheless, Senator Hatch proposed an alternative solution of providing
additional federal tax credits to smaller entities that have undertaken significant expenses to
accommodate the disabled, rather than allowing small businesses to discriminate. Id. Scholars
also note that the distinction between independent contractors and employees is tenuous, and that
statutory provisions covering only employees have been drafted more out of habit than reason.
E.g., Carlson, supra note 69, at 363-64 ("[E]mployee status is the basis for defining the
enterprises and institutions subject to the law, and for defining the individuals who enjoy the
protection of the law. An employer who employs ten employees and fifteen independent
contractors is not subject to the law and is free to discriminate. An employer who is subject to the
law can also discriminate, provided it only discriminates against its independent contractors.").
Professor Richard R. Carlson then proposed that gross revenue would be a better determinant of
coverage. Id. at 366.
208. Press Release, Nat'l Council on Disability, Achieving Independence: The Challenge for
the 21st Century (July 26, 1996), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1996/julyl996.
209. Id.
210. See O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at I ("As Justin Dart, a disability rights activist, explains,
'[d]isability used to signal the end of active life. Now it is a common characteristic of a normal
life-span." (quoting Justin Dart, Fallacy and Truth About the ADA, WASH. POST, July 18, 1995,
at Al 1)).
211. Id at 1-2 (quoting ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE BODY SILENT 117 (1987)).
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indicating that "there are still major obstacles that prevent equal access for
people with disabilities." 212 This continued lack of access to jobs, combined
with the general lack of protection provided to independent contractors, creates
a subclass of workers who are denied many of the rights and entitlements of
the average American employee.213
To adhere to the intent and plain language of the Rehabilitation Act, the
Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split by holding that the decisions of
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are correct. 214 Such a ruling would unequivocally
protect all people, like Kim, from disability discrimination in the workplace.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the current state of the law, independent contractors and employees of
small businesses can be discriminated against on the basis of a disability by
companies receiving federal funds; these individuals are provided no recourse
215in a number of jurisdictions. Federally funded programs, however, should
be held to a higher standard-one that the Rehabilitation Act intended to
require.216 Currently, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits allow for federal funds to
assist in employment discrimination of persons who are otherwise capable of
217reasonably performing the job in question. Such discrimination would not
be tolerated based on other protected classifications.218 As a result, the
Supreme Court must render a judgment on this matter. A bright-line rule
indicating that the Title I definition of employer is not incorporated into
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act would close a gaping hole in disability
rights jurisprudence, as well as shore up the rights of small business employees
and independent contractors.219
212. Press Release, Nat'l Councill on Disability, NCD and the Americans with Disabilities
Act: 15 Years of Progress (July 26, 2005), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom
/publications/2005/ 06262005.
213. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part tllB.
215. See supra note 1617 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part IlI.B.
217. See supra Part II.A.
218. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (2006) (outlawing discrimination
against blacks and women by places of public accommodation).
219. See supra Parts IIL.C-D.
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